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Abstract. UML-B is a `UML like' notation based on the Event-B for-
malism which allows models to be progressively detailed through rene-
ments that are proven to be consistent and to satisfy safety invariants
using the Rodin platform and its automatic proof tools. UML, on the
other hand, encourages large models to be expressed in a single, detailed
level and relies on simulation and model testing techniques for verica-
tion. The advantage of proof over model-testing is that the proof is valid
for all instantiations of the model whereas a simulation must choose
a typical instantiation. In the INESS project we take an extant UML
model of a railway interlocking system and explore methodical ways to
translate it into UML-B in such a way as to facilitate proof that the
model satises certain safety properties which are expressed as invari-
ants. We describe the translation attempted so far and insights that we
have gained from attempting to prove a safety property. We propose some
possible improvements to the translation which we believe will make the
proof easier.
1 Introduction
The aim of the INESS project [1] is to develop specications and associated
material to assist in the development of a European common standard for rail-
way interlocking systems. The role of the WP4 group within INESS is to develop
ways to verify UML models of such interlocking systems. Other partners in WP4
are using model-checkers to verify a translation of the UML models. While this
method benets from a high degree of automation, the size of models that can
be veried is limited by performance constraints and each instantiation of the
model (i.e. interlocking layout) has to be veried separately. We are exploring
the alternative approach of using theorem provers to verify (a translation of)
the model. While this approach generally requires a higher degree of expert
intervention depending on the size and complexity of the model, it does not
suer from state-explosion to the same degree and once completed is valid for
all possible layouts that satisfy the constraints of the model. Proof however, can
quickly become intractable in real-world problems. The key to proving some-
thing, therefore, is to abstract away from the details and prove much simpler
properties which can then be used as lemmas in the proof at the more detailed
level. Renement is the process of introducing more detail into the model in or-
der to move from the simpler abstract version to the detailed concrete level andrequires further proof to ensure that the concrete model is consistent with the ab-
straction. The renement that we use can be broadly categorised into horizontal,
superposition where more details are added without altering the representation
of the abstract model, and vertical data renement where the abstract model is
replaced with a more complex version. The latter is, in general, a more powerful
form of abstraction and involves more substantial proof to show the correspon-
dence between the models. In fact, the intention of the renement is generally
given in the form of a `gluing invariant' which species the relationship between
the abstract variables and the concrete ones. The gluing invariant may also be
used as a lemma in the proof of properties at the detailed level.
In this paper we report on an investigation into translating a UML model
of an interlocking system into a formal renement based notation so that safety
properties can be formally proven to hold. We use a small given example of an in-
terlocking model which is constructed in a style which is proposed by the INESS
project for use in the railway industry sector and we select and prove one safety
property from its requirements specication to demonstrate our method. We
would normally recommend considering safety properties at the earliest possible
stage [2] but this requires expertise in nding useful abstractions. Instead, we
adopt a rather naive approach where our renements are constructed mechanis-
tically from the UML structure without abstracting the main concepts involved
in the safety property and we then attempt to add the safety property at a late
stage. The purpose of taking this approach was to determine to what degree a
mechanistic, low expertise, approach would succeed and where we would need
to introduce more abstraction in order to succeed in the proof. Indeed, when
we initially tackled the proof of the safety requirement, not only did we nd it
dicult, but also, we could not detect whether it should be provable or whether
there was a problem in the model. For a second attempt, we introduced a more
useful abstraction into the model which enabled us to detect some errors in the
original UML source model and then prove the safety requirement in a more
abstract form. We were then able to prove the more concrete form of the safety
requirement using the abstract property.
Our goal in the INESS project is to develop techniques for using our methods
to prove safety requirements in UML models of interlocking systems. As depicted
schematically in Fig. 1, to do this we need to translate the UML model and
its associated safety requirements into our notation where we can apply the
automatic prover. The primary aim of this paper is to report on our ongoing work
on INESS. However, we also see a more general contribution emerging which is a
set of guidelines for building formal models from semi-formal entity relationship
and state machine models (including UML models) so that the process is better
dened and it is clearer where stronger abstractions will be needed than those
that can be inferred mechanistically.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the methods
that we use. In section 3 we describe the source UML model that we were given
to verify. In section 4 we describe our mechanistic approach to translating the
UML model into a series of UML-B renements. In section 5 we describe ourFig.1. Schematic block diagram illustrating the translation of the UML model and
associated safety invariants into the UML-B notation
interpretation of a safety requirement and how the pursuit of a proof led us to
revise our modelling approach and to uncover safety problems in the original
model. Section 6 outlines how we intend to develop our approach in response to
the ndings reported here. Section 7 is the conclusion.
2 Background
The Unied Modelling Language (UML) [3] is a semi-formal diagrammatical
modelling notation which has been adopted relatively widely throughout indus-
try. UML includes several diagram notations which can be used for dierent as-
pects of a system and for dierent stages of the development process. The UML
diagram notations that we are concerned with are `Class Diagrams' which can
be used to show the relationships between dierent kinds of entities and `State
Diagrams' which give a state oriented view of the behaviour of the classes. To a
lesser extent we are also interested in `Use Case Diagrams' and `Sequence Dia-
grams' which are used together to illustrate the requirements of a system. UML
is often interpreted exibly and to some extent this is a strength, but it is some-
times criticised for having imprecise semantics which may lead to confusion and
ambiguity. Some variants of UML have been developed which are constrained
and more precisely dened. UML has no notion of renement.
Event-B [4,5] is a state-oriented formal modelling language that was devel-
oped for modelling at the systems level. State is represented by typed variablesand spontaneous transitions (guarded events) occur to alter the state. A cen-
tral concept of Event-B is renement, where more detailed state is added and
this reveals more detailed events. The Rodin platform has been developed as a
formal modelling environment for Event-B and includes a static checker and a
prover. The Rodin platform [6,7] is designed to be extensible and many plug-in's
are available which extend the Event-B language or provide additional tools for
model development, verication and validation.
We base our approach upon UML-B [8,9], Event-B and the Rodin platform.
UML-B is a visual front-end for the Event-B notation and includes a state ma-
chine diagram editor. Tool support for UML-B is provided by a plug-in to the
Rodin platform. State machines may be rened by adding nested state ma-
chines [10] and can be animated via a plug-in [11] that utilises the ProB [12]
model checker and animator. The state machine renement supported by UML-B
allows the model to be progressively developed in stages. This improves under-
standing, and hence validity, as features can be laid down in small steps while
the Rodin provers ensure consistency. Invariants can be added to states (i.e. the
state being active becomes an implicit antecedent for the property) providing
another mechanism to clearly state our understanding of the model with further
consistency checking via the Rodin provers. One use for invariants is to express
safety properties that we believe the model satises so that we can prove that
this is indeed the case. Animation of the state machine diagrams allows us to
test that they behave as we expected.
3 UML model of Interlocking
For the purpose of investigating and demonstrating how to apply our methods
in this domain, we were given a small UML model of an interlocking system,
called micro2010 [13], which had been constructed in a style that is typical of
the full scale models that are expected to be produced during or after the INESS
project. The model is constructed using the Artisan UML tool [14] in a variant of
the UML called xUML [15] which can be executed in a simulation environment
called Cassandra [16]. xUML has a precise but easy to read action and constraint
language which is interpreted by the Cassandra simulation tool. The advantage
of this model is that it has an operational semantics as dened by the Cassandra
simulation.
The micro2010 UML model is based on a structure of classes as shown in
Fig 2. The class HAL represents the control of a physical device in the system.
Hence the class structure making up the modelled interlocking system controller
mirrors the components in the physical track layout. There are subclasses for
signal, track and point. The class, route, represents a concept used in railway
interlocking systems where a collection of track layout components constitute
a path through the layout that a train may wish to follow. The safety of the
system is based on a route being requested and subsequently allocated provided
that all the components in that route are free and not allocated for use in any
other route. The route class therefore has several associations with the logicalFig.2. UML Class Diagram showing structure in the interlocking model
device classes which identify the components involved in that route. Note that,
for verication by proof, we do not need to specify the values of these classes
and associations, the proof is valid for any valid instantiation, whereas, for model
checking or simulation an example conguration is congured or generated by
instantiating these classes and giving values to all the associations.
The classes often own derived attributes which represent a boolean condition
over properties of the class and its associated classes. Derived attributes (desig-
nated by a preceding slash /) do not represent any new state, they are a short-
hand way of expressing a boolean condition over variables that are elsewhere in
the model. For example, the point class has a derived attribute, /is locked, which
is true if and only if that point belongs to a route that is currently established.
There is no actual variable attached to /is locked, so it can never be assigned to
in an action but it may appear in guards as a shorthand for its denition.
The behaviour of each class is specied by a state machine diagram. Examples
of two such state machines are shown in Figs 3 and 4. The state machines
are composed in a hierarchical manner with some states containing sub-states.
The behaviour of the system is specied in terms of guarded transitions that
may re when the system is in their source state. For convenience, guards are
usually specied using a derived attribute (e.g. moveLeft[not /isLocked] in Fig
3). There are several dierent ways by which a transition may be triggered.
Transitions stereotyped ic are triggered by a send action in another transition
(e.g. moveLeft in Fig 3). Transitions stereotyped dv are triggered by external
events in the environment (e.g. atLeft in Fig 3). Transitions named with the
keyword `after(t)' are triggered spontaneously after the time t since the sourceFig.3. UML State Machine of Points
Fig.4. UML State Machine of Routesstate was entered (e.g. after(3) in Fig 3). Transitions named with the keyword,
`when', are triggered spontaneously when their guard condition is true (e.g.
when([/proceed-conditions-ok]) in Fig 4).
4 Translation to UML-B
UML-B provides equivalent modelling diagram notations to those used in the
UML model (i.e. Class and State-machine) but with minor syntactic and signi-
cant semantic dierences. In general UML-B is less exible because it is strongly
founded on the Event-B formalisation, but in most cases there are no signicant
problems in translating the diagrams. We also introduced some new features into
UML-B in order to assist the translation. However, the semantic dierences in
transitions deserves some attention. Due to their correspondence with Event-B
events, the only mechanism for triggering transitions in UML-B is spontaneous
triggering when the transition guard is true (`when' transitions). The other tran-
sition triggering methods used in the UML model are handled as follows.
Externally triggered transitions are modelled using spontaneous triggering
in the same way as `when' transitions. Since we do not explicitly model the
environment, the transition is considered to implicitly represent the response to
an event occurring in the environment.
Timed transitions are modelled using spontaneous triggering in the same
way as `when' transitions. Since we do not explicitly model time, the transition
is considered to implicitly represent the response to a time limit being reached.
Since the properties we wish to verify only concern event ordering, this is su-
cient for our purposes provided that there are no cases where two timing events
compete from the same system state.
Internally triggered transitions are represented by modelling a message pass-
ing system. A base class buer owner is inherited by all other classes and pro-
vides an attribute which is a set of messages received by an object in that class.
A transition that needs to be internally triggered waits for an instance of its
trigger message to be received by its owning object and removes that message
as it res. In a UML-B renement, new transitions may only modify variables
that have been introduced in that renement and are not allowed to alter the
variables introduced in previous renement levels. This means that we can not
alter the buer in any subsequent renement levels after we rst introduce the
buer. To avoid this problem we provide an event that non-deterministically
modies the buer attribute so that transitions introduced in subsequent rene-
ments may rene this behaviour by sending trigger messages to other objects and
removing their own trigger messages. Note that although this mechanism does
not impose any ordering on triggering within an object and does not allow for
multiple triggering of the same transition it is sucient for the safety properties
being veried.
As in Event-B, renement is a key concept within UML-B. Even without
introducing a safety property, there are signicant proof obligations concern-
ing the internal consistency and well-denedness of the model and these wouldbe dicult to handle if the model was introduced in a single stage without re-
nement. Therefore, we need to build the UML-B model in several renement
stages. Since this is a research experiment aimed at nding a method that can
be applied to bigger and more general UML models of interlocking systems, we
also require that the method of introducing renements is methodological and
does not rely on high expertise in renement and abstraction. Three potential
methods for introducing renement are considered.
a) Class inheritance has some analogy with renement. Classes higher up the
inheritance structure can be introduced and modelled without knowledge of
subclasses. These inherited classes have features that are common to their
subclasses which can be modelled in an abstract level before the subclasses
are introduced in a subsequent renement. In this case the micro2010 model
contains one inherited class, HAL which does not contain any interesting
behaviour. Therefore we do not use this technique in this translation.
b) Class associations and behaviour can be examined for dependency and used
to determine a priority ordering for introducing classes. It is usually the
case that the classes exhibit a hierarchy in the way that they control each
other with one class responding to instructions from another (via the internal
triggering mechanism). The associations give a clue to this hierarchy because
internal triggering occurs between instances that are linked by associations.
In the class diagram of the micro2010 model (Fig. 2) observe that the track,
signal and point classes are not connected by association whereas the route
class connects with all three. It is apparent that the track, signal and point
classes are independent and can be introduced in any order whereas the
route class is dependent on the others and must be introduced last. This is
conrmed by examining the internal triggering where the route class is the
only one that sends triggers while the other classes are only responding to
them.
c) State machine hierarchy can be used to introduce the full behaviour in stages
following the hierarchy of nesting within the class' state machine. Nested
state machines only elaborate the behaviour of the parent state machine
which can be constructed in a way that is valid without the nested one. We
use this method to introduce the point class in three renements and again
to introduce the route class in two renements
These 3 methods should be used in the order shown since this will result in an
appropriate ordering with respect to class dependencies. We also suggest using
the 3 methods in a 'depth rst' manner. That is, the highest (most abstract) level
classes in the inheritance structure should be introduced rst and fully rened
using methods b and c before the next level in the inheritance structure is dealt
with. Similarly the classes introduced by analysing the associations should be
fully rened by method c before the next priority according to associations is
dealt with.
There is no facility in UML-B for representing derived attributes. Therefore
derived attributes are fully expanded with their denitions wherever they are
used and only introduced at a renement level where all the features requiredFig.5. UML-B State Machine Diagram showing the behaviour of points in the working
state
by their denitions have been added to the model. However, our experience of
proving (described in chapter 5) has led us to the conclusion that there needs to
be more abstraction of features of the model. We are now re-assessing whether
these derived attributes represent useful abstractions that should be introduced
in early renements for the purpose of proving important properties.
The renement steps of the UML-B version of the railway interlocking model
can be summarised as follows: (The application of the methods outlined above
is shown for each renement).
m0 Introduces the message passing mechanism used for internal triggering of
transitions. (No method - prior to translation).
m1 Introduces the signal class and its state-machine describing its behaviour
which sets the signal to proceed or stop in response to internal triggers.
(Method b).
m2 Introduces the track class and its state-machine describing its behaviour
which sets the track to free or occupied in response to internal triggers.
(Method b).
m3 Introduces the point class and its rst level state-machine describing its
behaviour to go to the broken state if a command is not achieved within a
time limit and to recover if another internal trigger is received. (Method b).
m4 Elaborates the behaviour of the point class when it is in the working st state
by adding the nested state-machine shown in Fig. 5. (Method c).
m5 Elaborates the behaviour of the point class when it is in the moving st state
by adding the nested state-machine shown in Fig. 6. (Method c).
m6 Introduces the route class and its rst level state-machine shown in Fig. 7.
(Method b).Fig.6. UML-B State Machine Diagram showing the behaviour of points in the moving
state
Fig.7. UML-B State Machine Diagram showing the behaviour of routesm7 Elaborates the behaviour of the route class when it is in the established st
state by adding a nested state-machine. (Method c).
m8 Adds the safety invariant to check that points that are in an established
route do not move. (No method - add invariant).
In order to reason about the UML-B model and, in particular, to discuss the
invariants, we need a textual representation of the value of a state machine. This
is provided by the UML-B toolset since it automatically translates the diagrams
into an equivalent Event-B model for verication purposes. The tool translates
each class into a set with the same name as the class, and each state machine to
a variable using the name of the state machine. (As a convention we have named
the state machines after their parent with " sm" appended). The state machine
variable is a function from the set representing the class to an enumeration of
the states in the state machine. The value of a state machine for a particular
instance of a class is therefore available by function application. Associations are
constant relations between the class sets and values can be accessed by relational
image. Hence we can refer to the left points of a route, r, as left points[frg] and
a point, p, being in the left position as point sm( p) = left st.
5 Proving the Safety Invariant
Once the UML-B model is developed throughout its levels of renement, we can
turn our attention to verifying that it satises the safety requirements. Up to
this stage, until we introduce some safety requirements, the proof only concerns:
a) well-denedness (e.g. that where a function application is used, the function
is dened for that value),
b) typing (i.e. that an assignment doesn't contravene a dened sub-range of a
variable's basic type) and
c) simulation (i.e. that the the principles of renement are observed).
These proof obligations, which are mostly discharged automatically by the Rodin
provers1, ensure that the model is constructed correctly in a consistent manner
but do not prove anything about how the model behaves.
A more interesting and challenging use of proof is to introduce some invariant
property which we require to hold at any time in the model. These invariant
properties are ideal for expressing safety requirements. The micro2010 UML
model contains four safety requirements which are stated in natural language in
the documentation. We choose one of these safety requirements for the purpose
of illustrating our method.
SR1: A point that is locked by an established route shall never move.
1 Some theorems were added at the rst renement to help the provers discharge POs
about the renement of buer assignmentsThe safety requirement is worded with a little redundancy since, by denition,
a point is locked by establishing a route to which it belongs. Since we have
expanded away all derived attributes, such as /is locked, in our UML-B model,
we re-state the safety invariant as follows:
SR1': A point that belongs to the left points or right points of an estab-
lished route shall never move.
We can now translate this into an invariant using the features of our UML-B
model. When translated to plain Event-B this state invariant becomes::
SR1 : 8r;pr 2 route ^ route sm(r) = established st ^ p 2 (left points[frg] [
right points[frg]))(p 2 dom(working sm))working sm(p) 6= moving st)
SR1 is read as follows: For all p and r, where r is a route which is in the state
established st and p belongs to the union of the left points and right points of r
then (if p is in the domain of the state machine, working sm then) p is not in
the state moving st. Note that the condition in brackets is not a logical necessity
since if it is not true then the point is not even in the super state of moving st,
however, it is included so that the prover can discharge a related proof obligation
that the function application, working sm(p), is well formed.
We were unable to prove this safety invariant and suspected the original UML
model to be unsafe. Often when this is the case, examination of the proof obli-
gation helps understanding the problem and suggests a correction in the model.
However, in this case it is not obvious why the proof obligation is not provable
and how the model can be xed. The diculty stems from the late arrival of
the concept of routes and the consequent lack of abstract representations of the
concepts involved in the safety invariant. In fact, the original UML model intro-
duces the abstract concept of locking (albeit for dierent reasons) which we have
discarded due to diculty in translation. To improve our model we re-worked it
from renement level m4 where point is introduced and at this stage we model
the derived attribute is locked as a boolean attribute of the point class. This
allows us to express, at an earlier stage, the fact that points must not move
while locked, even before specifying the real meaning of locked. At this stage we
introduce some non-deterministic alteration of the locked attributes which are
later rened into the behaviour of routes. We introduce an invariant into the
moving st state of the point class to express the constraint that the point should
not be locked when it is moving. In doing so we prove an abstract equivalent of
the safety invariant SR1, namely:
SR1a: A point that is moving is not locked.
The invariant can be seen in the state moving st of Fig 5. When translated
to plain Event-B this state invariant becomes:
SR1a : 8thisPoint((thisPoint 2 point))((point sm(thisPoint) = working st))
((working sm(thisPoint) = moving st) ) (locked(thisPoint) = FALSE))))The invariant in the diagram is translated from dot notation to function ap-
plication to obtain locked(thisPoint) = FALSE. The contextual position of the
invariant in the sub-state moving st of the state working st of a state machine
belonging to the class, point, gives rise to the chain of antecedents.
In attempting to prove this we realised that the model has unguarded tran-
sitions to moving st which are triggered when a point is requested to move to the
position it is already in (transitions move left from left and move right from right).
Perhaps this was not considered by the UML modellers to be a genuine move
for the purpose of safety but, if this is the case, it is not possible to (formally)
distinguish safety in the given model meaning that we have been given an im-
possible task. To investigate further we corrected the model by adding guards
to prevent these transitions when the point is locked allowing us to prove the
abstract safety invariant SR1a.
Having established that locked points do not move, to complete the proof of
the safety invariant, we need to prove that the points in an established route are
always locked. (This is the gluing invariant corresponding to the data renement
that replaces is locked with membership of an established route). That is:
GL1 : 8r;pr 2 route ^ route sm(r) = established st ^ p 2 (left points[frg] [
right points[frg]) ) locked(p) = TRUE
Given the abstract invariant, SR1a and the gluing invariant, GL1, the original
safety invariant, SR1, is discharged easily by the Rodin provers. In fact, since it
follows directly from SR1a and GL1 we can make SR1 a theorem so that it only
needs to be proved once.2
However, the gluing invariant still can not be proved for the transitions,
cancel route and established idle, that reset locked to false (or to use the concrete
representation, release an established route). Upon examination, we realise that
the model does not prevent two conicting routes (that share common points)
from being established concurrently (so that a point is locked by two routes at
the same time). In this case, the gluing invariant is violated when either one
of the routes is cancelled and unlocks its points. The location of the mistake
is in another derived attribute of the UML model, proceed conditions ok, which
is dened as `all left points of the route are at left, all right points of the route
are at right and all tracks of the route are free'. Hence the proceed conditions
dened in the source model prevent a route from being established when its
points are not in the required positions but not if another route has already
established and locked those points in the correct positions. Strictly speaking, the
safety requirement we are working on does not specify anything about conicting
routes, it was an assumption we made in our gluing invariant. We could design
an alternative, provable, gluing invariant which allows for conicting routes, but
since the micro2010 UML model also contains a use-case that indicates that a
`set route' request should not succeed if one of its points is locked by a route, we
2 In Event-B, and hence UML-B, to prove an invariant it is necessary to prove that
every event results in a state that satises the invariant whereas a theorem is deduced
from the other invariants and theorems.deduce that there is a mistake. To correct it we add a guard to the transition,
setting up established, in the route state machine Fig. 7 of renement level m6.
The guard ensures that none of the points that are used in the route are already
locked:
Guard4 : locked[left points[fself g] [ right points[fself g]] = fFALSEg
The guard uses the contextual instance, self, of the class, route (i.e. self is the
route being set up by the transition setting up established). The guard can be
read as, the only value of locked for all the left points and right points of self, is
FALSE.
Note that this is the same transition that locks the points used by the route.
It is important that this is done in one (atomic) transition to a) ensure that the
guard remains true when the locks are set and b) so that the derived attribute
is locked is rened by its denition.3.
After adding this guard we are able to prove the gluing invariant for the
two transitions that render a route un-established, i.e. cancel route and estab-
lished idle. This completes the proof of the safety invariant SR1.
The statistics for proofs are given in the following table. The automatic
provers are congurable so that the user can choose which provers to try and
specify timeout values. These gures represent a conguration with a meta-
prover (called Relevance Filter) enabled. With this meta prover enabled, before
tackling the safety requirement in m8, only one PO (from m6) requires inter-
active proof. All of the POs relating to the abstract safety invariant in m4 are
discharged automatically. In m8, three PO's required interactive proof. These
are the proof of the intermediate state invariant when a route is established and
the two (identical) proofs that the transitions that un-establish a route satisfy
the gluing invariant.
Renement Proofs Automatic Interactive
m0 7 7 0
m1 11 11 0
m2 18 18 0
m3 15 15 0
m4 88 88 0
m5 34 34 0
m6 34 33 1
m7 26 26 0
m8 16 13 3
It is interesting to know where the eort lies in carrying out this verication
work. The eort in actually carrying out an interactive proof is minor. Now that
3 Although, for clarity, we have retained is locked, we would like the option to remove
it in a later renement and our proof of SR1 relies on the data renement where it
is replaced by its denitionthe model has been constructed and corrected, we could conduct the interactive
proofs within an hour at most. Similarly, discovering and correcting errors in the
model is not particularly time consuming because the proof obligations quickly
lead one to the problem. However, the iterative process of attempting the proofs,
running into diculties and improving the modelling techniques to make the
model more amenable to proof, took several weeks of eort.
6 Future Work
As part of our role in the INESS project we will continue to prove other safety
requirements in the micro2010 model. We expect to nd that similar techniques
of introducing more abstraction are necessary and hope this will lead to a general
method. Hence we will investigate in more detail how to methodically generate
abstract concepts from UML derived attributes in a way that helps us prove
safety invariants. We will continue this investigation using more extensive exam-
ples in order to test the generality of the method.
We are also interested in developing guidelines for constructing a UML-B
model in renements from a UML model that has none. For this purpose, the
micro2010 model has given us some initial ideas but is somewhat limited. We
plan to investigate these guidelines using some more extensive examples of in-
terlocking models that are also available as part of the INESS project.
Another approach that we have previously investigated [2] is to start by
modelling the most abstract model that is needed in order to demonstrate the
safety requirements. It may then be possible to develop the full translated model
as a renement of the safety requirements, hence showing that the model is
safe by construction. We would like to investigate this alternative approach in
comparison to that presented here.
7 Conclusion
We have investigated a mechanistic approach to translation of a UML model
into a series of UML-B renements and the introduction of safety invariants at a
nal stage. We found that this approach has limitations because the renement is
based on the structure of the UML model resulting in a superposition approach
to renement (often called horizontal renement). The safety invariant to be
proved becomes too complicated to a) nd a proof, and b) to nd why it is not
provable in the model. We deduce that the translation does not provide enough
abstraction of concept (often called vertical renement) and suggest that derived
attributes of the UML source model may provide a clue to introducing this
methodically through the translation. When we introduced a vertical renement
using the derived attribute is locked we were able to nd and rectify two problems
in the model and subsequently proved the safety invariant with relative ease using
the abstract version of it and the gluing invariant of the re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